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Research Note:  
‘Hello, world’i: GCHQ, Twitter and social media engagement 
 
ABSTRACT: In May 2016, Britain’s signals intelligence agency the Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ) joined the social media platform Twitter with the message ‘Hello, world’. For an 
agency once seen as the UK’s ‘most secret’, GCHQ’s moved to social media received significant attention from 
the press and other social media, often resulting in ridicule or clichés around the ‘Big Brother’ state. But why 
the move and what has been the impact? Can GCHQ’s use of Twitter provide lessons for other agencies 
considering adopting this method? The article suggests that, while certainly welcome, and allowing the agency to 
reach out to a new tech-savvy generation of potential recruits, while questioning stereotypes of what GCHQ 
does, efforts towards openness can only go so far and sometimes stoke and amplify conspiracy theories affecting 
issues such as brand identity.  
 
Introduction 
In May 2016, GCHQ announced its social media presence to the public with the simple tweet “hello world” 
– a traditional phrase beloved of computer programmers when introducing new programmes to public 
view. In the following few days the tweet attracted significant coverage, (and ridicule), in the mainstream 
media – with many commenting on the apparent disjuncture of supposedly highly secretive agencies on 
public networks. Whilst other parts of government, and even the intelligence and security agencies, have 
had a long-established online presence with open job advertising and websites, the arrival of intelligence 
agencies on social media symbolically suggested a new more open era. Did it signify an acknowledgement 
in the post-Snowden era of the need to engage and rebuild public trust or, as cynics commented, a more 
superficial PR driven exercise? In fact, in the case of GCHQ, the social media account has more specific 
aims in terms of recruitment and a geographical restructuring of GCHQ.ii However, as we will also note, 
there are perhaps unintended consequences in types of audience that have been attracted – notably as the 
focal point for conspiracy theorists and opponents of state intelligence agencies. 
Whilst there has been considerable focus on the private uses of internet surveillance and big data 
to achieve intelligence objectives, the public presence of security agencies has attracted minimal academic 
attention. Hence, in this research, we explore this public presence via GCHQ’s Twitter platform, 
concentrating on three particular aspects: Strategy – in particular we review some of the reasons why they 
have public presence i.e. what they are seeking to achieve? Content – how GCHQ attempt to achieve this 
i.e. what sort of content are they delivering online and to what ends? Audience – how successful are they 
in engaging with either wider public audiences or specific targeted groups and who are trying to engage 
with them? To do this, we reviewed public documents linked to Intelligence agencies social media activities 
to understand their stated objectives. Then in order to see whether such objectives might be met, we 
gathered Twitter output from, and audience response to, the GCHQ platform. In short, what does GCHQ 
tweet about and why and who makes up the audience? The results indicate a somewhat mixed picture. At 
one level, there has been a relatively smooth transition into the social media public world with a platform 
providing regular GCHQ related content. However, exploration of the Twitter audience and their response 
to GCHQ is illustrative of difficulties of such government agencies operating in a highly public sphere 
which is often seen as intensely polarised and where demands for constant authenticity and openness are 
often met with scepticism, cynicism and hostility.  
 
Government Organisations and Social Media Presence: Why Bother? 
The social media presence of government departments and agencies is part of longer history of gradual 
adaptation to the internet. E-government programmes, created in the 1990s, often initially led to criticisms 
that governments were merely replicating their offline activities online, or just dumping information online 
with little thought as to its purpose.iii Latterly, however, and especially with the growth of social media, we 
have seen more consideration of how social media might reshape, or reconnect, the relationship between 
the public and governments.iv Because of the unique role and position of intelligence and security agencies, 
it difficult to find a clear counterpart in other parts of government in terms of social media strategy and 
usage. They provide public service, but unlike other government agencies these services are not really 
individualised or publically measurable. Nevertheless, it is worth acknowledging the broad reasons why 
Government organisations engage with social media because, in doing so, it underlines the rather unique 
challenges that GCHQ faces in a very public social sphere. In essence, government social media presence 
tends to revolve around key functions: 
• Providing information on policy: At a basic level, government seeks to use social media to inform 
the public of what they are doing, how they are implementing policy and changes to the operation 
in how they work.  
• Delivering services online: clearly much of government is involved in service provision. Over the 
past two decades many government services have moved online to provide ease of access for 
citizens and increase their efficiency and lower the costs of service delivery.v  
• Interacting and engaging with the public: the interactive possibilities of technology provide 
opportunities for government to gather feedback and respond to public questions and criticism. 
This even goes as far as to suggest that the public can reshape or co-produce policy through regular 
interaction online.vi 
• Impression management: Social media arguably allows organisations to communicate their 
message more directly to audiences without relying on the potentially distorting prism of 
mainstream media. Hence, there is the ability for organisations and institutions to shape their 
messages, control their image, market themselves, and ultimate to create a brand image with the 
public.vii 
• Building consent and legitimacy? The four factors outlined above could be argued to serve a further 
benefit – strengthening trust, or, at least, consent from the public.viii Hence, the online presence of 
government departments could also be seen as humanising bureaucracies notably through the 
personalisation of interactions and storytelling for audiences. Transparency, the use of humour, 
presenting the dilemmas of governmental activity and acknowledging criticism are all part of this 
process.ix 
 
All of these basic functions, however, present some obvious, (and some less obvious), difficulties for 
intelligence agencies. Whilst they can provide information about their broad function, it is clearly difficult 
for them to detail much of their work. Equally, while they could be seen as providing public service, (public 
protection), in a general sense, again the covert nature of work means this is not individualised or, easily, 
publically measurable. Interaction, conversation and dialogue are also problematic, since staff cannot be 
identified. Moreover, such organisations have never engaged in direct relationships with the public.  Yet, 
the move into social media could be seen as a partial response to rebuilding trust in the wake of Snowden 
revelations, at least by allowing a public face to the organisation [see below]. However, the basic difficulties 
outlined above, mean that intelligence agencies are always likely to be circumscribed in what they can 
achieve. As we shall see, therefore, the focus of social media accounts becomes more limited and, arguably, 
less well defined. 
 
 
Intelligence Community and Social Media Strategies: From Private to Public? 
Of course, the use of social media by intelligence-security agencies is not new. In the UK, social media has 
presented the ‘intelligence family’ with new opportunities to understand, and respond to, security issues, 
with social media spaces ‘significantly relevant to security and public safety’.x Social media intelligence or 
‘SOCMINT’ joins human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence 
(IMINT) as an important tool for agencies, even if it could be argued that SOCMINT is an off-shoot of 
traditional open source information, rather than a separate entity.xi While the use of social media as a 
surveillance tool requires a sound statutory footing, with clarity and transparency needed over its use, Sir 
David Omand, former GCHQ Director and the UK’s first Security & Intelligence Coordinator, argues that 
SOCMINT is important for ‘identifying criminal activity; giving early warning of disorder and threats to 
the public; or building situational awareness in rapidly changing situations’.xii Social media has also become 
the frontline in the so-called ‘Post-Truth’ or ‘Fake News’ era, with algorithms used to tailor news and 
propaganda to individuals, with the digital world used to ‘shift popular mood without recourse to the 
clunkier tools of old-fashioned propaganda’.xiii But social media is more than just a tool to monitor and 
shape public understanding; it allows intelligence agencies to engage, rather than traditionally hide from 
public debate, while also offering avenues to target and recruit a new, much younger, and tech-savvy 
generation of entrants. In the UK, both the London-based National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), the 
part of GCHQ charged with protecting public and private networks, developing academic and private cyber 
capability, and disseminating online security knowledgexiv, and GCHQ use Twitter, respectively joining in 
November 2015 and January 2016. Understandably, given their different remits, both use social media in 
different ways, although they acknowledge the importance of having a social media presence. NCSC also 
uses the business and employment-ordinated LinkedIn platform, while GCHQ uses the Facebook owned 
picture and video-sharing service, Instagram, even if Twitter is the largest social media platform for both 
NCSC and GCHQ. In October 2019, NCSC joined GCHQ on Instagram, announcing ‘It’s time to get a 
new generation excited about cyber security. If we want to speak to a younger, more female and more 
diverse demographic we have to be where they are, so we are delighted to announce that from today we 
are now on Instagram! #ThreeYearsOn’.xv 
In the case of GCHQ, the use of Twitter provoked media attention after the agency shared its first 
post ‘Hello, world’ in May 2016. ‘Given its remit to monitor electronic communications, you would imagine 
the intelligence agency was already on the social media site. But now it's tweeting’, reported BBC News, 
while The Guardian reported that the feed, having come after months of discussion, was ‘part of an effort 
to make the secretive Cheltenham listening post slightly more transparent and improve its public image’, 
even if initial reaction to the account was ‘mockery’.xvi Former Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott 
tweeted, ‘After years of following us, we can now follow them!’ – a theme reflected across social media 
reaction, with BBC Security Correspondent Gordon Corera tweeting, ‘In a reversal, lots of people on 
Twitter are now wondering why they are NOT being followed by @GCHQ -although it is following James 
Bond’.xvii The Financial Times ran with the habitual Le Carré reference, ‘Tinker, tailor, tweeter, spy’xviii, while 
satire site Daily Mash shared an article claiming the agency was on Twitter to ask ‘if anyone has any terrorist 
stuff going on this weekend’.xix The media surprise at GCHQ’s new online ‘openness’ was perhaps a 
response to the traditional secrecy that surrounded the organisation’s work. GCHQ was long considered 
to be the most secret of Britain’s agencies, only begrudgingly avowed in 1982 following the case of KGB 
spy Geoffrey Prime, and officially placed on the statute books (alongside Britain’s foreign intelligence 
agency the Secret Intelligence Service) by the Intelligence Services Act in 1994, starting an increasing 
trajectory of public engagement and avowal.xx But why use social media, and why now?  
The use of social media by intelligence agencies was not actually new, especially in the United 
States. Indeed, the use of social media generally in government had already been firmly established on the 
other side of the Atlantic, especially following the announcement of Barack Obama’s Open Government 
Initiative and Directive.xxi Social media allowed federal agencies, Michael Landon-Murray writes, to 
effectively ‘meet people “where they are”, with the frequently posited benefits of public education, 
engagement and participation, service provision, collaborative efforts and co-production, openness, 
transparency and accountability, trust building, and communication efficiency’.xxii In December 2013, the 
US signals intelligence organisation, the National Security Agency (NSA), joined Twitter. By June 2014, the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had also joined Twitter, sending it’s first-ever message: ‘We can neither 
confirm nor deny that this is our first tweet’. Within hours, it had been retweeted more than 85,000 times, 
attracting over 100,000 new followers, and, as of October 2019, had 2.7 million followers.xxiii While widely 
reported, both were following the precedent set by other members of the US intelligence and security 
community.xxiv The Federal Bureau of Investigation, largely because of its role as the leading federal law 
enforcement agency, launched into social media in November 2008, with more than seventy separate pages 
or sites across Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, and Flickr, representing field offices across the US. The FBI 
was followed shortly afterwards by the first US intelligence-related Twitter account for the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, the effective head of the multi-agency US intelligence community, 
directing and overseeing the US intelligence effort, which joined in July 2009, and which now has over 
112,000 followers. The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) created a Twitter profile in February 2010, and 
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency joined in August 2011.xxv Today, the US intelligence 
community has a total of over 3.6 million Twitter followers, with many more on other social media 
platforms.xxvi While admitting there was still much to be done, a survey of US intelligence social media 
found that America’s agencies were making positive strides to educate, engage, and provide some limited 
transparency of the intelligence community’s activities.xxvii In the UK, social media can be seen as part of 
the wider strategy of openness on intelligence matters that started in the 1990s, seeing ever-increasing 
engagement with journalists and the public.xxviii As in the US, it can be argued that social media offers a 
similar avenue to engage, educate and give insight into intelligence activities, while giving new modes of 
outreach at a time when Britain’s agencies are looking for greater personnel diversity, following criticism 
from the Parliamentary Intelligence & Security Committee. As such social media is important for two 
reasons: education and diversity. 
It is no surprise that the organisations using social media are signals intelligence agencies looking 
for new recruits plugged into the ‘internet of things’. As society becomes more integrated and networked, 
there has been an increased requirement to protect society from actors who wish to use the internet, and 
computer-controlled systems as an attack vector. Technological innovations have made it cheaper, and 
easier, to place more data and critical national infrastructure (CNI) on computer-based systems that may 
also be connected in some way to global internet networks. These developments have drastically increased 
the threat of cyber-security attacks that intelligence and security agencies must identify and combat. A failure 
to protect against such attacks by both state and non-state actors could be catastrophic. For instance, 
Stuxnet, a computer worm used to attack components of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, destroyed 984 
uranium enriching centrifuges and set the program back significantly.xxix In 2015, the world’s first successful 
cyberattack on a national power grid left 225,000 people without power in Ukraine.xxx While no attack has 
yet successfully knocked-out UK CNI, there is growing pressure on GCHQ and NCSC to protect an 
increasing number of potential targets from a growing threat.xxxi However, CNI is only one area in which a 
state may be vulnerable. There have also been information warfare attacks by other states, primarily through 
social media, and there is also the ever-present danger of serious organised criminal groups utilising the 
internet for nefarious activities. As a result, organisations such as GCHQ and NSA have been required to 
significantly increase their capacity to combat digital threats to match the pace of change that comes with 
each technological innovation. To build this capacity, intelligence agencies not only need the finances for 
expensive technical infrastructure; they, more importantly, need the staff with the necessary skills to 
undertake cyber-security activity. Yet in recent years there have been multiple reports that intelligence 
agencies have struggled to recruit and retain much needed digital talent. In the US, the Comprehensive 
National Cyber Security Initiative of 2008 (later declassified in 2010), highlighted that ‘there are not enough 
cybersecurity experts within Federal Government or private sector to implement the CNCI [Comprehensive 
National Cyber Security Initiative]’xxxii. In the same way, British intelligence is facing similar issues. One report 
by the UK’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC)xxxiii stated that competition from the private sector 
is a contributing factor to a 22% shortfall in recruitment within GCHQ.xxxiv The agency said it was ‘getting 
value’ out of apprentices and other staff brought in at a young age, but the biggest challenge was, officials 
admitted to the ISC, ‘retaining them obviously and developing them and giving them a sort of rounded 
career’.xxxv The same report also stated that the agency ‘struggles to attract and retain a suitable cadre of in-
house technical specialists because it inevitably has to compete with big technology companies which are 
able to pay significantly more’.xxxvi The drain of specialist staff in GCHQ has been a long running issue; in 
the ISC’s 2011-12 report, it was highlighted that GCHQ was losing ‘critical staff with high end cyber 
technology skills at up to three times the rate of the corporate average (3.4%)’, a situation blamed, Director 
Ian Lobban to the committee, on the ‘growing market for cyber security experts … government could not 
match the salaries that industry was offering. As a result GCHQ was training staff who were then recruited 
by the private sector, attracted by higher salaries and greater benefits’.xxxvii In January 2012, it was reported 
that GCHQ was giving ‘retention payments’ to prevent staff leaving for high-tech companies such as 
Google and Microsoft.xxxviii This suggests that a range of skills shortages and competition from the higher-
paying private sector is reducing cybersecurity capacity, in an area where there is already a significant skills 
gap in the UK.xxxix 
A culture mismatch is also hampering recruitment efforts, as revealed by the ISC’s July 2018 report 
on ‘Diversity and Inclusion in the UK Intelligence Community’.xl British intelligence has the perception of 
being predominantly white, male and middle-class. Lingering perceptions that recruitment is conducted 
through a tap on the shoulder during an Oxbridge education go some way to suggest that a job is 
inaccessible to those outside this demographic, though the reality is that the situation today – with online 
and print media advertising and other channels for advertisement – is largely different from the recruitment 
practices of the past. Of course, the UK is not alone in seeking to diversify the make-up of the agencies. In 
the US, the Director of National Intelligence has launched an Office of Diversity and Inclusion to promote 
a more diverse workforcexli, ending what one former CIA operations officer called a ‘white-as-rice culture’xlii 
which saw US intelligence staffed by ‘white, male, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant Americans’.xliii In 2017, the 
Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) launched its Diversity and Inclusion Strategy, to increase 
diversity amongst its workforce, with a focus on representation from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people.xliv Australia’s foreign intelligence agency was joined in this new diversity strategy by the domestic 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) the following year.xlv In 2019, ASIO launched its own 
Mudyi – Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Staff Network committed to ‘promoting an inclusive 
workplace culture that values and celebrates’ Aboriginal and Torres staff, and a separate network developing 
greater gender diversity.xlvi Britain’s agencies also recognise the need for change, having been criticised 
heavily for their lack of minority representation. Figures from 2004 showed that just 9% of MI5’s recruits 
came from BAME backgrounds.xlvii By 2007, MI5 had a BAME workforce of 6.5%.xlviii In 2010 The Sunday 
Times published extracts from a leaked report, first commissioned by the Cabinet Office, which found there 
was a ‘very small pool’ of BAME staff in GCHQ with several interviewed suggesting workplace prejudice. 
Among the complaints recorded were: ‘I wasn’t born here, and although I have been security cleared I am 
constantly challenged about my loyalty to Britain by my colleagues’, while another said, ‘The security officers 
ask questions which are culturally inappropriate, insensitive and offensive’.xlix In March 2015, the ISC called 
for more women in the agenciesl, while the July 2018 ISC report criticised the lack of representation 
amongst minority BAME, LGBT and disability groups, with the agencies still ‘not gender balanced’ or fully 
reflecting ‘the ethnic make-up of modern Britain’ finding that only one of the agencies – GCHQ, had ‘any 
staff at Senior Civil Service level who declared as BAME’.li While the committee blamed organisational 
cultures and security vetting, recruitment and engagement was also a problem area even if agency campaigns 
were ‘increasingly innovative as the Agencies seek to promote “brand awareness” and attract a more diverse 
range of applicants from under-represented groups’.lii For MPs, existing recruitment campaigns, despite 
attracting significant attention, failed to ‘receive enough applications from people from across a sufficiently 
wide range of backgrounds’, with individuals from diverse backgrounds having a ‘stereotypical image of 
these organisations’. As an earlier ISC report into the role of women in the UK’s agencies suggested, 
‘Recruitment campaigns have to evolve to challenge the norms, particularly those surrounding the 
seemingly male-dominated intelligence world. We should encourage the use of more positive role models 
to break down the stereotypes that have been established and reinforced by the entertainment industry’.liii 
For the agencies and MPs, recruitment needed to ‘reach out to under-represented groups in new ways, and 
to move away from the more traditional mechanisms’, targeting ‘lifestyle magazines and … social media’ 
rather than just newspapers and websites.liv Responding to the ISC’s report, the government acknowledged 
that aspects of the agency recruitment campaigns had started to work: ‘MI5 has seen an increase in BAME 
and female applications across campaigns in Q1 2018 compared with Q4 2017/18. Since February 2017, 
female applicants to GCHQ increased considerably from 2016/17. This illustrates the impact that 
recruitment campaigns are having on applications’.lv 
Intelligence agencies have long tried to move away from the traditional ‘tap on the shoulder’ 
approach to recruitment. In 2009, GCHQ ran a recruitment campaign through Microsoft’s Xbox Live for 
‘quick thinking 18- to 34- year olds’lvi, following its first-ever game targeted ad campaign in 2007, running 
the strapline ‘Careers in British Intelligence’ in games including Tom Clancey’s Rainbow Six: Vegas, and 
Splinter Cell Double Agent, as part of a general drive by Britain’s agencies to attract new talent.lvii Recruitment 
through online gaming is just one example of GCHQ’s efforts to diversity and innovate in recruitment. In 
November 2015, it used reverse graffiti – creating an advert by cleaning pavements using a stencil and 
pressure washer – to create the cryptic message, ‘GCH-Who? Technical Opportunities gchq-careers.co.uk’, 
appearing in Manchester, Birmingham, Wolverhampton, Leeds and Shoreditch, East London, especially 
targeting tech start-ups and ‘hipsters’ – a campaign that led Hackney Council to threaten enforcement action 
for graffitiing.lviii GCHQ also took out an advert in the Pride Issue of LGBT magazine Fyne Times, including 
the line: ‘Alternative perspectives spark the innovative thinking needed to achieve our mission. You can see 
things differently. So we can flourish’.lix In May 2018, SIS also launched its first TV advert in a bid to ditch 
the traditional James Bond image and attract more female and ethnic minority applications. The advert, 
which opened with the image of a shark, featured a mother comforting her child with the tagline ‘Secretly, 
we’re just like you’, was followed by another ‘Barbershop Advert’ in January 2019 as part of a wider 
‘#secretlywerejustlikeyou’ ad campaign on YouTube and Google Display.lx In October 2019, it was 
reported that SIS had been recognised as one of the UK’s best organisations for social mobility having run 
a campaign to attract ‘working class spies’.lxi Despite ISC concerns about BAME recruitment, the Security 
Service (MI5) was listed as one of the leading ‘employers for race’lxii, while GCHQ now targets BAME and 
female candidates through ‘GCHQ – Decoded’ and all-female cyber-training workshops.lxiii In October 
2019, working with the government’s in-house design agency, Design102, GCHQ won an award – coming 
top out of 6,000 applications – at the annual Digital Communications Awards, for the ‘Journey to GCHQ’ 
campaign aiming to attract ‘women and young people’ by following the careers of existing members of 
staff, a campaign that attracted increasing interest in online adverts and resulted in media attention.lxiv 
Social media is also an important part of GCHQ’s educational strategy. As GCHQ Director of 
Communications Andrew Pike suggested: the feed would allow his agency to ‘use its own voice to talk 
directly about the important work we do to keep Britain safe’, explaining, ‘We want GCHQ to be more 
accessible and to help the public understand more about our work. We also want to reach out to the 
technical community and add our voice to social media conversations about technology, maths, cyber 
security, and other topics where we have a view’. Topics covered would include ‘history, mission outcomes, 
languages, maths, cyber security, technology and innovation, job opportunities and as a way of signposting 
events, publications, news, blogs, and opinion pieces’.lxv Following their entry to Instagram, GCHQ officials 
explained ‘People generally know we’re working 24/7 to help keep the country safe, but they don’t get the 
chance to see behind the scenes. Hopefully this will help dispel some myths and show who we are as 
individuals … You'll not only learn about our work to stay one step ahead of those wishing to do us harm, 
but also get a glimpse at our hobbies, clubs, and coffee shops’.lxvi But beyond just education, the feed could 
also, as The Telegraph pointed out, ‘win back public confidence’ that had been dented by some of the more 
lurid claims of mass surveillance after Snowden’s leaks.lxvii As was noted in 2014, following the appointment 
of Director Robert Hannigan, GCHQ had to cope with new demands for ‘greater transparency’ with the 
traditional stand-off stance to media and public attention ‘no longer a realistic option’. As The Telegraph’s 
editorial explained, ‘the intelligence agencies need to be better at explaining what they do to keep us safe 
and why it is important that they continue to do it. They have a good story to tell and from the little we 
know of Mr Hannigan, a former communications chief in Northern Ireland, he is considered the person 
best able to tell it – and to lead GCHQ out of the shadows’.lxviii In the 21st Century, the UK’s intelligence 
agencies need to maintain an online presence, with social media being just part of the strategy, even if SIS 
and MI5 do not use these platforms yet. However, what effect has GCHQ’s use of social media had, and 
has the organisation reached the target audience it wants? Who now follows GCHQ’s Twitter account, and 
are they speaking to the right people?  
 
Content & Audience: Methods & Data 
To understand the nature of GCHQ on social media, its’ audience, and the comparison with the wider 
social media activity of the ten other agencies in the UK, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, this 
research used two separate data collections from the Twitter platform. Twitter was chosen for this research 
as the Application Programming Interface is much more accessible to researchers. The first of which was 
a collection of a sample of tweets sent on Twitter by these agencies alongside any tweet containing, 
mentioning, tweeting to, replying, or retweeting eleven separate intelligence agencies over the month of 
February 2019. In total, this project collected 203,019 tweets. The second data collection gathered follower 
data on 482,302 different Twitter accounts (or roughly 7% of the total follower network of the agencies 
identified here). Overall, we are confident that this data represents a good sample of the overall networks 
that engage with the Five-eyes agencies on Twitter. Two sets of analysis were then undertaken. The first 
was a content analysis of the types of posts created by GCHQ. Content analysis is a method of deriving 
qualitative data from quantitative sources. This analysis was used to understand the strategy in place by 
GCHQ when it comes to Twitter. This second set of analyses was through social network analysis using 
SNA analysis software Gephi (Bastian et al. 2009). This was used as a visual and numerical method of 
understanding the groupings which formed within the surrounding the 5-eyes, and around the social 
presence of GCHQ communication. Furthermore, we were also able to use Gephi to find which intelligence 
agencies had the most importance in the networks and the online discussions. 
 
Results: GCHQ in the Twittersphere 
In February 2019, the GCHQ Twitter account posted 76 times, much higher than other accounts from the 
5-eyes agencies (see table 1). Through content analysis it was found that nine tweets (11.8%) were directly 
related to recruitment. These posts are directly advertising vacancies such as software developers, linguists, 
and intelligence analysts, suggesting that vacancy posts were only a small proportion of the messages they 
posted using the social media website. However, we also found an increased number of posts related to 
building its employer brand with underrepresented groups within its workforce (women, LGBT+, BAME, 
disability/mental health, and faith). Analysis found a total of 12 (15.8%) posts celebrating the agencies 
history, or culture in regard to either of these demographics. In addition, there were two further posts 
(2.6%) communicating messages to so-called ‘future codebreakers’ encouraging young people to develop 
the skills needed for the work the agency does. From the perspective of employer branding, these posts can 
be considered indirect recruitment messages that attempt to make the agency more attractive to these 
groups. Four additional posts (5.2%) could be considered employer branding, but instead to a general 
audience, such as posts from behind the scenes, or what it is like to work at the agency. This suggests a 
two-pronged approach to recruiting staff for GCHQ – firstly, to display that the workplace culture is 
favourable and accepting of people from the desired underrepresented demographics within its workforce, 
correcting perceptions of the agency, and secondly, to display active vacancies as they arise to a general 
audience. However, this still only accounts for 27 (35.5%) of the messages posted by the agency. 
When compared to the other agencies included in this study, it seems a pattern can be seen within 
the types of intelligence agencies and how they approach the use of Twitter. Through all the accounts, an 
average of 30.5% (SD. 18.7) of all tweets are related to recruitment. However, those agencies with a 
requirement for harder to recruit roles also had a higher number of recruitment related messages. Agencies 
whose operations lends itself to cybersecurity or STEM-related activitieslxix, particularly the Australian 
Signals Directorate, NSA, the Canadian CSE, GCHQ, and NGA had more recruitment messages with a 
total 42.5% being recruitment related. This is compared to 22.4% for all other agencies such as the CIA. 
Providing some evidence that amongst those agencies in the study, a common theme is the use of social 
media for recruitment. However, where the platform is arguably filled with certain demographics (such as 
‘techies’) and the agencies are activity seeking these types of candidates to fill much needed cybersecurity 
and other STEM roles, there will be an increase in the overall number of recruitment posts, though the 
success of this strategy needs to be measured in future reports by the UK ISC. 
 
 
Image 1:   Tweet from GCHQ celebrating their LGBT+ credentials by lighting communication dishes in rainbow pride 
colours. An example of employer branding.  
 
The other 64.4% of posts by GCHQ consisted of news, such as covering the celebration of the 
agencies 100th year and visit by the Queen, puzzles, historical facts or statements by the agency director, 
Jeremy Fleming. In effect, much of this content falls within the advice of the Government Digital Service’s 
recommendations on the use of social media, and the educational remit of GCHQ’s social media.lxx That is 
content related to raising awareness of the organisation's activities and role, promoting a particular type of 
culture, and promoting trust in their functions. For instance, linking the current day organisation to its 
famous Second World War past at Bletchley Park, or by highlighting positive news stories and officially 
backed GCHQ media content. Stories included the avowal of GCHQ’s former Palmer Street site in central 
Londonlxxi, historical blogs on SIGINT for the First World War centenary, and the forthcoming GCHQ 
exhibition at the London Science Museum. From this, it is evident that the agency is not just using Twitter 
as a recruitment tool and has other visible communicative purposes. While in comparison, it seems that the 
Twitter account for the NCSC is much more targeted, with content specifically aiming to reduce the levels 
of cybercrime and improve cyber security within the UK, with practical advice aimed at businesses and 
everyday uses with tips on how to stay safe online, and notifications of security vulnerabilities within 
commonly used software.  
 






























GCHQ 9 12 2 4 76 27 35.5 
NSAgov 1 5 4 4 20 14 70.0 
FBI 6 5 0 1 50 12 24.0 
CIA 2 2 0 4 36 8 22.2 
Defenseintel 0 0 0 0 15 0 0.0 
ODNIgov 1 2 0 0 19 3 15.8 
NGA_GEOINT 7 3 0 5 42 15 35.7 
NCSC 0 12 11 2 132 25 18.9 
csiscanada 7 2 2 4 29 15 51.7 
ASDGovAu 2 3 0 0 11 5 45.5 
cse_cst 9 3 2 5 39 19 48.7 
TOTAL 44 49 21 29 469 143 30.5 
 
Table2. Comparison of 5-eyes agencies in the number of specific diversity recruitment messages 
 Targeted demographic 
Twitter account LGBT+ Women BAME Disability Mental 
Health 
Faith 
GCHQ 6 2 2 0 1 1 
NSAgov 0 4 1 0 0 0 
FBI 0 0 5 0 0 0 
CIA 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Defenseintel 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ODNIgov 0 1 1 0 0 0 
NGA_GEOINT 0 0 2 0 0 0 
NCSC 0 11 0 0 0 0 
Csiscanada 0 0 1 0 1 0 
ASDGovAu 0 3 1 0 0 0 
cse_cst 0 2 1 0 0 0 
TOTAL 6 24 14 0 2 1 
 
 
Table: How effective is this communication strategy for communicating with diverse groups? 
Out of all the agencies, it seems that the GCHQ had attempted to attract a more diverse range of 
candidates, being the only account to seek to significantly attract LGBT+ applicants, and overall creating 
messages for five of the six demographics tested against, while most other agencies only accounted for two 
or under of these same groups within their tweets. In addition, GCHQ had the highest number of tweets 
aimed at encouraging candidates from diverse groups to apply, matched only by the NCSC (who was live 
tweeting an event for female coders, inflating their overall figures). It could, therefore, be argued that when 
compared to other agencies, it was GCHQ who has been seeking to attract a more diverse workforce. 
However, this does not provide any evidence to suggest they are successful at reaching these audiences – a 
topic in need of future research.  
To find out to what extent GCHQ was able to connect with a more diverse audience, network 
analysis was used to test which groups they communicated with on Twitter. Network graph 1 (see Appendix 
I) shows the network for all tweets that contain GCHQ or mention the agencies Twitter account. While 
this does not show who had seen tweets by GCHQ, it acts as an indicator for who has been talking about 
them. This graph shows that the agency’s recruitment activity is, indeed, connecting with some of their 
intended audience. For instance, small networks can be found related to recruitment events, such as a 36-
node network surrounding an event based focussed on women coders in Manchester; a 31-node network 
surrounding the activity of a collaboration between the Made By Dyslexia charity and GCHQ advertising the 
agencies hiring policies of people with Dyslexia. There was also a further 29-node network surrounding the 
work of GCHQ staff collaborating with Code Club to teach schoolchildren coding, suggesting the 
collaboration with relevant partners is giving GCHQ access to a segment of their target audience (Women, 
potential future candidates, and people with dyslexia). However, it should be remembered that this type of 
activity is small compared to the overall network (96 nodes out of a total of 2,752), and there were no 
observable networks relating to people from BAME or LGBT+ backgrounds. More significant activity 
within the network can be found in relation to news. For instance, the Queen’s visit to GCHQ’s 
Cheltenham offices to celebrate 100 years of the organisationlxxii, takes up much of the overall network. 
Other areas relating to news can be seen occupying large areas of the network, such as tweets relating to a 
VPN news story amongst other loosely bound groups of political news. Suggesting that much of the Twitter 
communication is outside of the agency’s control and is dictated by news events rather than attempts to 
draw attention to their recruitment activity or to build trust in the agency generally. Other tightly bound 
clusters of the network were also found to be dedicated to conspiracy theories, or contain anti-GCHQ 
sentiment. The nonsensical mentions found within the graph are often filled with users tagging in the 
GCHQ twitter account for no apparent reason, or to use it as a debating tactic. In one example, a user 
mentioned the GCHQ account while calling another user a paid shill or troll after expressing disagreement 
with current policy in Saudi Arabia. Another larger cluster saw GCHQ as part of wider ‘deep state’ and 
included its Twitter handle, connecting it to theories regarding the use of so-called ‘chemtrails’ – a bizzare 
belief that the condensation trails produced by high-flying aircraft are actually chemical or biological agents 
spread by government as a means of mind controllxxiii, or the apparent involvement of GCHQ in ‘pizzagate’ 
– a story of a fictitious child trafficking ring involving US Democratic Party officials shared by the alt-right 
and other opponents of Hillary Clinton’s 2016 campaign. Many other mentions related to supposed 
coverups or ‘hiding the truth’. Another popular conspiracy shared online using the GCHQ hashtag is the 
claim that the agency helped spy on the Trump campaign in 2016. The claims, popularised by White House 
Press Secretary Sean Spicer in early 2017, led to an unprecedented rebuke from GCHQ, but have continued 
to be shared online, especially allegations that GCHQ Director Robert Hannigan was part of the conspiracy, 
‘to surveil’ Trump promoted by users of 4chan, popular with the alt-right and conspiracy theorists.lxxiv 
When compared to the overall follower network (network graph 2, Appendix II), it seems that the 
majority of followers are localised to specific national contexts. For instance, while many followers of the 
FBI will also follow CIA and NSA, they will not also follow other intelligence agencies within the 5-eyes. 
This is represented on the graph by the significant clusters around each agency, and the relative closeness 
of agencies from the same nation. In comparison to the overall network of tweets that mention one of the 
5-eyes (network graph 3), a similar pattern can be found, except that the network is more dominated by 
agencies with a larger international name recognition (FBI, CIA & NSA). This suggests that just having an 
agency Twitter account will not automatically raise the profile of the agency, and other external factors such 




The initial findings here suggest that social media carries with it advantages and disadvantages for 
intelligence agencies. As we noted at the outset, these organisation’s experience of social media is always 
likely to be more circumscribed than the majority of government departments and agencies. Excited PR 
chatter about building interactive client relationships or dialogues and personalising and humanising 
services are always going to be more difficult where you cannot talk back, and staff cannot be identified. 
Arguably, then trying to benchmark GCHQ against standard lessons from e-government approaches is 
always likely to be difficult. Such agencies are in a rather unique position. Hence, it makes more sense to 
examine their current social media communication in the context of their historical evolution and their 
intelligence counterparts elsewhere. Indeed, GCHQ’s example reflects the US experience that Twitter and 
other forms of social media can engage, educate and give some insights into intelligence activities. For 
instance, GCHQ’s feed has been useful in promoting its organisational history in its centenary year, in 
highlighting important cultural events and sending the general message that inclusivity and diversity are 
now integral for GCHQ as it looks to develop in the 21st Century. The feed also shows a sense of humour; 
one of the most popular tweets shared was a response to the 2019 Dr Who New Year special when Dalek 
were shown attacking GCHQ. The next day, GCHQ Tweeted: ‘We’ve just about finished cleaning up the 
mess … but we’re happy to confirm GCHQ is at full operational capacity’.lxxv By November 2019, GCHQ 
reached 100,000 followers, celebrating by offering followers the opportunity to win a copy of The GCHQ 
Puzzle Book II, signed by Director Jeremy Fleming. ‘Reaching 100,000 followers in our centenary year is a 
great achievement, and shows the growing understanding the public has of our mission to help to keep the 
country safe’, said ‘Chris’, GCHQ’s head of external relations.lxxvi The US experience also shows that 
agencies can have significant outreach, a lesson that can be applied to the UK example where GCHQ is 
currently leading. Although use of Twitter and other platforms by the UK’s other agencies remains to be 
seen – and there is no suggestion that SIS or MI5 will join GCHQ and NCSC it the Twittersphere, there 
could be advantages to MI5, for example, which already has an established programme of historical 
engagement, recruitment outreach and speeches by the service’s Director General which could be used as 
the basis for online content to be shared with new audiences through social media.lxxvii In 2009 MI5’s then 
Director General Jonathan Evans also suggested that with the growing threat of domestic terrorism, it was 
vital to be ‘as open and transparent as possible … because that openness, by supporting public confidence 
in us, helps us do our job of protecting national security’ – something social media can help with.lxxviii Even 
SIS, an organisation that has traditionally avoided publicity, had a link to its first TV advert shared through 
GCHQ’s feed. Being on Twitter would potentially allow agencies the ability to connect and reach out to 
external audiences they may not otherwise talk to. As seen by GCHQ, partnerships with groups such as 
Code Club brings with it access to their audience, helping meet recruitment goals and hit particular target 
groups for diversity and inclusion.  
But there are also significant warnings. Simply having an account on Twitter that attracts thousands 
of tweets and notifications relating to news and recruitment often acts as a focus for anyone wanting to 
send hostile messages – a phenomenon not just experienced by intelligence agencies. In a general sense, it 
underlines some of the limitations to any impression management strategy via social media. While in the 
past, believers in the ‘deep state’ and hidden hand were restricted to sending malicious letters, writing in 
unscrupulous journals or ranting while standing on a box at Hyde Park’s Speakers Corner, the very public 
nature of NCSC and GCHQ’s social media means it quickly becomes a target for abuse, potentially 
damaging the brand identity and attracting adverse reactions that the online publicity was designed to deflect 
in the first place. Going back to the initial aim of allowing GCHQ to use its own voice to ‘talk directly’ to 
social media uses, it is clear that the agency policy of not engaging in a two-way dialogue often limits the 
overall ability to interact with their audience. In practice, while GCHQ may want to add its voice to social 
media conversations about technology, maths, cyber security, and history, such messages are drowned out 
by the wider noise generated by other Twitter users, bots and believers in the ‘deep state’. It should be also 
pointed out that even if GCHQ responded to the more hard-core conspiracies online, it would probably 
have little effect as many are created in an echo-chamber of like-minded believers and, when formed, are 
unlikely to finish, having, as observed by David Aaronovitch in his history of conspiracies, flexibility where 
‘any new and inconvenient truth can be accommodated within the theory itself’.lxxix Equally, GCHQ’s 
message that their actions are proportionate, and able to discriminate between the activities of everyday 
citizens and suspected targets is unlikely to alter opinion, shaped heavily by the Snowden revelations, 
amongst civil liberties groups that modern-day SIGINT agencies have the capability to and regularly do – 
to quote former NSA Director General Keith Alexander – ‘Collect everything’ on individuals.lxxx Adding 
to the these external pressures can be in-house opposition to agencies going too far in the direction of 
openness, especially being seen to normalise use of social media – a long-held concern for staff in the UK’s 
agencies – and the possible dangers of sharing images of staff and facilities. GCHQ’s head of external 
communications acknowledged that ‘Generating fresh social media content which protects our staff 
identities but provides a peek inside GCHQ was always going to be a challenge’.lxxxi Even just launching 
the Twitter feed was a ‘tortuous process’, explained The Financial Times Defence and Security Editor in May 
2016, ‘GCHQ and all of its staff are subject to draconian security procedures that restrict contact with the 
outside digital world beyond the agency’s operational channels. Setting up a presence on social media has 
taken months of wrangling’.lxxxii Today, there are still significant concerns that social media usage can 
encourage employees to lessen their guard, exposing them to intelligence rivals or non-state actors. In 
August 2019, western officials warned that LinkedIn is used extensively by China’s foreign intelligence 
agency to cultivate new sources.lxxxiii 
While the analysis presented above provides an overarching image of the communicative landscape 
for GCHQ and other intelligence agencies, there is certainly scope for additional research in terms of 
understanding the audience. This research shows that a comprehensive understanding of the types of 
people who are following intelligence agencies online is needed. A profile analysis alongside a more 
comprehensive dataset of Twitter followers of each agency would help better understand the groups and 
types and numbers of followers. For example, are they academics, cybersecurity professionals, heavy news 
consumers, or bots and trolls attempting to distort online debate? While GCHQ’s use of Twitter is to be 
applauded, the impact and outreach has to be questioned. The evidence from the above suggests that the 
conversation about GCHQ is very much outside the hands of the agency, with the conversational agenda 
being set by current affairs, a clear contrast with NCSC’s social media activity. In contrast to GCHQ, much 
of NCSC’s content is practical e-security advice and threat warnings. A browse of tweets sent out in late-
November 2019 showed that topics included practical advice on two-factor authentication, email security 
and anti-spoofing, safety in election campaigns, dealing with common online threats, and how to enjoy 
online gaming safely and protecting personal and financial data. In the same period, GCHQ tweeted about 
recruitment, the regular brainteasers building on the success of The GCHQ Puzzle Book parts one and 
twolxxxiv, a CBBC cyber competition and links to older news items. To some extent, the content reflects the 
different aims of both organisation’s social media presence and the differing levels of ‘transparency’ that 
both can provide. For NCSC, with its growing public and business-facing remit, the feed is an excellent 
way to disseminate expert advice. By contrast, GCHQ as a SIGINT organisation can only briefly talk about 
support for the military and counter-terrorism effort in public, not the wider focus on foreign 
communications, even if, alongside NCSC, it shared details of ‘Equities Process’ and the decision to reveal 
flaws in software.lxxxv Both accounts also show that post-Snowden transparency and public engagement can 
only go so far. As NCSC CEO Ciaran Martin writes, ‘A significant proportion of our work has continued 
to take the form of defending against hostile state actors. We can say that Russia, China, Iran and North 
Korea continue to pose strategic national security threats to the UK, but we can’t often talk about the 
operational successes and the full range of the NCSC, GCHQ and wider state capabilities that are deployed 
against them’.lxxxvi To talk about successes often undermines techniques and tradecraft and most officials 
would agree with the often-quoted CIA saying that ‘the secret of our success is the secret of our 
success’.lxxxvii In concluding, this study suggests that GCHQ and NCSC use of social media is a welcome 
step-change from traditional engagement activity, but there needs to be an objective discussion of the pros 
and cons of public-facing online activity to improve public understanding and knowledge of intelligence 




Appendix I: Network Graph 1. Network of Tweets sent during February that contain ‘GCHQ’ 
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